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INTRODUCTION
In the long fight for freedom and equality, the crucial first step of
protecting rights must be quickly followed by a remedy for violation of
those rights. Without accountability, protection of rights and liberty is
little more than a paper promise.
One hundred and fifty years ago, Congress passed Section 1983 to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and ensure that individuals could go
to federal court to redress constitutional violations by state and local
governments and officials and obtain justice. Enacted in 1871 against the
backdrop of horrific state and Ku Klux Klan violence aimed at undoing
Reconstruction and a criminal justice system that systematically devalued
Black life,1 Section 1983 gave those victimized by official abuse of power
a critical tool to hold state and local governments and their officials
accountable in a court of law. It aimed to stop state actors and others from
killing, brutalizing, and terrorizing Black people with impunity. Section
1983 sought “to carry into execution the guarantees of the Constitution
in favor of personal security and personal rights,” reflecting that, in our
constitutional system, “judicial tribunals of the country are the places to
which the citizen resorts for protection of his person and his property in
every case in a free Government.”2
In the text of Section 1983, Congress demanded government
accountability, seeking to put an end to the denial of fundamental rights
and subjugation of those seeking to enjoy the promise of freedom after
centuries of chattel slavery. What is less well known is that Congress
explicitly rejected the idea that persons should be exempt from
responsibility simply because they held a position of power. Congress
modeled Section 1983 on the Civil Rights Act of 1866,3 a statute that
refused to provide any official immunities because that would “place[]
officials above the law.”4 Congress viewed official immunities as akin to
the idea “that the King can do no wrong.”5 This history has not received
the attention it deserves.

1 Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative
History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987, 1013 (1983) (discussing passage of Section 1983
in 1871 against the backdrop of “substantial evidence of Klan violence[] and repeated familiar
complaints concerning the widespread, systemic breakdown in the administration of southern
justice”).
2 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374, 578 (1871).
3 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27; see infra text accompanying notes 32–36.
4 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866).
5 Id.
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The accountability Section 1983 sought to achieve has been
squelched by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has converted a
statute designed to open the courthouse doors to those aggrieved by
official abuse of power into a statute that bolts the courthouse doors
firmly shut, immunizing wrongdoers rather than holding them to account.
The respect for enacted text the Supreme Court repeatedly preaches has
been missing in action when it comes to Section 1983.
Rather than honoring the language chosen by Congress to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, the modern Supreme Court has rewritten the
law’s text, inventing a host of complex and confusing judge-made
doctrines that exalt the interests of public officials over the fundamental
rights of the people they are supposed to protect. Despite the fact that
Section 1983 explicitly gives individuals a right to sue government actors
for violating the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s modern Section 1983
jurisprudence is more concerned with protecting the police and other
government officials from suit than in reining in the systemic violence,
discrimination, and abuse of power visited all too often on the most
marginalized in our society.
In recent years, there has been an outpouring of writing chronicling
how the Supreme Court invented the doctrine of qualified immunity and
employed it to shield police officers and other state officials from suit for
all but the most egregious constitutional violations. As these critics have
argued, qualified immunity leaves a gaping hole in Section 1983, has no
moorings in our constitutional or common law systems of government
accountability, and erodes the enforcement of constitutional rights.6
Indeed, qualified immunity is anything but qualified—it approaches
a near-absolute immunity from suit. Qualified immunity requires
dismissal of a suit unless the state or local officer violated clearly
established constitutional rights, a standard that has no basis in the text of
Section 1983 or any common law backdrop and ignores the fact that at
the time Section 1983 was passed virtually no aspect of the Fourteenth
Amendment was clearly established in the courts. The clearly established
law standard is not self-defining—it could simply be a form of fair
notice—but the Supreme Court has construed it to be an almost
insurmountable bar to suit. In practice, unless the plaintiff can point to a
prior precedent with practically identical facts, courts insist that the law
6 See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 55 (2018)
(arguing that “there was no well-established, good-faith defense in suits about constitutional
violations when Section 1983 was enacted, nor in Section 1983 suits early after its enactment”);
Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1800
(2018) (arguing that “multiple aspects” of qualified immunity doctrine “hamper the development
of constitutional law and may send the message that officers can disregard the law without
consequence”); Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117
MICH. L. REV. 1405, 1440–60 (2019) (arguing that qualified immunity cannot be justified by
structural constitutional principles of separation of powers and federalism).
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is not clearly established. This allows officers to evade accountability and
ignores the fact that officers are not taught or expected to keep up with
the latest legal rulings.7
But qualified immunity is only one part of the story. The problems
go deeper.8 All too often, however, the scholarly literature fails to attend
to the ways the Court’s several immunity doctrines work hand-in-hand to
undermine accountability across the board. This Article corrects this
omission.
Qualified immunity is just one of four interlocking doctrines that,
together, form a system of government unaccountability and squelch
Section 1983’s promise of accountability: qualified immunity, absolute
immunity, strict limits on municipal liability, and the exclusion of states
from Section 1983. By gutting Section 1983 in a myriad of ways, the
Supreme Court has let state and local governments and their agents
violate our most cherished constitutional rights with impunity and left
those victimized by abuse of power without any remedy.
As sweeping as qualified immunity has become, the Supreme Court
has held that for some government actors, most notably prosecutors,
qualified immunity is not protective enough.9 Instead, in the Court’s
view, prosecutors must be shielded by absolute immunity when acting as
advocates, effectively negating the remedy Congress sought to create in
enacting Section 1983. Prosecutorial abuse of power was a grave concern
at the time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, and no court
had recognized prosecutorial immunity from suit when the statute was
enacted in 1871. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court created it out of whole
cloth. Like qualified immunity, the absolute immunity accorded
prosecutors has no basis in the text or history of Section 1983 and
undermines the rule of law.10 It means that a prosecutor can withhold
exculpatory evidence from a defendant in violation of settled legal
precedents with impunity. Even if prosecutors commit flagrant
constitutional violations, absolute immunity gives them a get-out-ofcourt free pass.
If individual officers cannot be sued because of judge-created
immunities, what about the governmental entity responsible for the
officer? That, too, is off-limits because, in another line of cases, the
7 Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Boldest Lie, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 677 (2021)
(“[A]mong the most pernicious aspects of the doctrine—its requirement that plaintiffs identify
cases in which courts have held unconstitutional nearly identical conduct—is based on a
misunderstanding of the role court decisions play in law enforcement policies and trainings, and
officers’ decisions on the street.”).
8 Fred O. Smith, Jr., Formalism, Ferguson, and the Future of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2093, 2107 (2018) (stressing “the importance of thinking about the synergistic way
that immunity doctrines operate to proverbially close the courthouse door”).
9 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 72–77.
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Supreme Court has invented what has been called local sovereign
immunity.11 Employers in the private sector are liable for the legal
wrongs committed by their employees, but the Supreme Court has
refused to apply this longstanding principle of accountability to
municipalities. Instead, local governments, with few exceptions, cannot
be held liable for constitutional violations committed by their officers
within the scope of their duties, even though it is the government entity
that authorizes, supervises, equips, trains, and pays the officer who
violated constitutional rights in carrying out their job. The Supreme Court
has held that a city can only be held liable if a municipal “policy or
custom” caused the constitutional deprivation,12 a limitation that appears
nowhere in the text of Section 1983 and has no basis in the statute’s
history. As Justice John Paul Stevens cogently observed, the policy or
custom requirement is “judicial legislation of the most blatant kind.”13
The Supreme Court has erected even more barriers to suing states
for constitutional wrongs, studiously ignoring how Reconstruction
reshaped our federal system in order to check states that ran roughshod
over individual rights. Even though the whole point of Section 1983 was
to alter the balance of power between the states and the federal
government and provide a federal forum when states and localities
infringed the Constitution, the Supreme Court has refused to read Section
1983 to permit suits against the states, turning a blind eye to the statute’s
obvious purpose of holding states accountable for constitutional
violations.14
This stark pattern illustrates just how far the Supreme Court has been
willing to bend the law to prevent holding the police, prosecutors, and
other state and local officials accountable when they abuse their power.
For far too long, the Supreme Court has stood firmly in the way of efforts
to hold state and local governments accountable for even flagrant
violations of constitutional rights, gutting Section 1983’s promise and
undermining the rights Section 1983 was enacted to protect. By making
any remedy virtually impossible to obtain, the Court has given the police
and other government actors an even freer hand to violate fundamental
rights. As a result, the cycle of police violence and prosecutorial abuse of
power continues unchecked.
The ball is now in Congress’s court. The Supreme Court has been
unwilling to reconsider the badly flawed, judicially invented legal
doctrines that have gutted Section 1983. Indeed, during the Supreme
Court’s current term, the Justices, without receiving full briefing and

Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409 (2016).
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–95 (1978).
13 City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 842 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
11
12
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holding oral argument, significantly expanded the reach of qualified
immunity and suggested that police officers cannot be sued for using
excessive force unless there is a prior Supreme Court precedent with
nearly identical facts.15 The six-three conservative majority is raising the
bar to accountability sky high. Lawmakers in Congress can and should
do what the Court will not—sweep away these rotten legal doctrines that
have eroded sacred rights and allowed lives to be taken with impunity.
This Article unfolds as follows. Part I analyzes the text and history
of Section 1983, laying out how the Reconstruction Congress gave
individuals a right to go to federal court to redress constitutional
violations by state and local actors. The historical record shows that
Congress provided a new federal cause of action to allow civil rights suits
to be brought in federal court because far too often state and local
institutions of power worked with the Ku Klux Klan or turned a blind eye
toward their racist terror. Part II examines how the Supreme Court gutted
Section 1983’s promise of accountability and systemic change. As this
review demonstrates, time and again the Supreme Court has engaged in
rank judicial legislation to thwart justice, creating immunities out of
whole cloth that cannot be justified by the text of Section 1983 or any
pre-existing legal backdrop. A short conclusion follows.
I. THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF SECTION 1983
The Fourteenth Amendment was the nation’s response to abuses in
the South in the wake of the end of chattel slavery and an attempt to
affirmatively guarantee the equality and protections that Black
Americans needed to participate fully in American life and thrive on
equal footing. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the South sought to strip
Black Americans of nearly every aspect of freedom, enact new laws to
criminalize Black life, and subject Black people to a new form of
slavery.16 In response to these abuses, the Fourteenth Amendment sought
to guarantee true freedom and equality. It sought to vindicate the
fundamental demands of Black Americans newly freed from bondage,

15 Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 8 (2021) (per curiam) (summarily reversing the
denial of qualified immunity because “[n]either Cortesluna nor the Court of Appeals identified any
Supreme Court case that addresses facts like the ones at issue here”); City of Tahlequah v. Bond,
142 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam) (summarily reversing denial of qualified immunity where
“[n]either the panel majority nor the respondent has identified a single precedent finding a Fourth
Amendment violation under similar circumstances”).
16 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at
199–202 (1988).
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who insisted that “now we are free we do not want to be hunted.”17 The
Fourteenth Amendment wrote into our national charter the idea that Black
lives matter, seeking to put an end to indiscriminate state-sanctioned
violence against African-Americans. It promised bodily integrity and
human dignity to all regardless of the color of their skin.18
That promise turned out to be insufficient. In 1871, several years
after the Amendment’s ratification, Southern intransigence continued,
with states “permit[ting] the rights of citizens to be systematically
trampled upon.”19 The primary impetus for the passage of legislation to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment was a reign of terror by the Ku Klux
Klan that was winked at or abetted by state and local governments. As
Representative David Lowe observed:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and
lynchings and banishment have been visited upon unoffending
American citizens, the local administrations have been found
inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective. . . . Immunity
is given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are searched
in vain for any evidence of effective redress.20

The breakdown of the law reached virtually every actor and every
part of the state system of civil and criminal justice. As Representative
Aaron Perry explained:
Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear
not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act
as if they might be accomplices. . . . [A]ll the apparatus and machinery
of civil government, all the processes of justice, skulk away as if
government and justice were crimes and feared detection.21

17 Letter from Mississippi Freedpeople to the Governor of Mississippi (Dec. 3, 1865), reprinted
in FREEDOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF EMANCIPATION, 1861–1867, SER. 3: VOL. 1: LAND
AND LABOR, 1865, at 857 (Steven Hahn et al. eds., 2017).
18 David H. Gans, “We Do Not Want to Be Hunted”: The Right to Be Secure and Our
Constitutional Story of Race and Policing, 11 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 239, 290 (2021) (“The
Fourteenth Amendment struck at centuries of history that permitted Black bodies to be violated
indiscriminately, and instead promised personal security to all.”).
19 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1871).
20 Id. at 374.
21 Id. at app. 78; id. at 394 (“[T]he courts are in many instances under the control of those who
are wholly inimical to the impartial administration of law and equity. What benefit would result
from appeal to tribunals whose officers are secretly in sympathy with the very evil against which
we are striving?”); id. at 459 (“The arresting power is fettered, the witnesses are silenced, the courts
are impotent, the laws are annulled, the criminal goes free, the persecuted citizen looks in vain for
redress.”).
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As a result, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments—what one
member of Congress called the “liberty amendments”—were “already a
practical nullity where these klans operate.”22
How did Section 1983’s cause of action against state and local
governments and their officials become part of a civil rights statute aimed
at checking the Klan’s reign of terror? The answer is simple: Congress
sought to hold state actors accountable for violating constitutional rights
because, throughout the South, state officials, often acting in league with
the Ku Klux Klan, were murdering and terrorizing Black people. The
Klan, Michigan Congressman Austin Blair observed, “are powerful
enough to defy the State authorities. In many instances they are the State
authorities.”23 Members of Congress described state officials issuing
baseless warrants to arrest Black citizens,24 as well as wanton violence by
white police officers in which “men were shot down like dogs in the very
portals of the temple of justice without provocation.”25 Brutal police
violence continued unchecked against those seeking to enjoy the
Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of real freedom.
The systematic denial of fundamental rights merited a remedy. The
1871 legislation—known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871—included a
number of provisions aimed at stopping the Klan’s terrorism, including
establishing civil and criminal liability against conspiracies to deprive
individuals of their fundamental rights and authorizing the use of martial
law and suspension of habeas corpus to check the lawless violence that
plagued the nation. The least controversial, though most enduring, part of
the Act—Section 1, now known as Section 1983—opened the door of the
federal courts to suits against “[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”26
Section 1983’s plain import was to “throw[] open the doors of the
United States courts to those whose rights under the Constitution are
Id. at 438–39.
Id. at app. 72; id. at app. 271 (“In many cases the local officers are in sympathy with the
marauders, and in others they are themselves members of their organization; and so, for all the
many hundred acts of violence and outrage committed by these bands, not a single man has been
brought to punishment, and the evil is growing and spreading every hour.”); id. at app. 108 (“The
sheriffs in Alamance and some other counties are in the order; the judges can do nothing; the juries
are in the way; we can make no convictions.”); id. at app. 183 (“State authorities are in complicity
with the criminals, aiding and abetting their lawless violence and of course refusing to call for
assistance from the General Government . . . .”).
24 Id. at 321.
25 Id. at app. 185.
26 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
22
23
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denied or impaired,” affording “an injured party redress in the United
States courts against any person violating his rights as a citizen under
claim or color of State authority.”27 The sweeping language Congress
employed—holding liable all persons acting under color of state law—
had ancient roots in the law: since the thirteenth century, the legal term
of art of “color of office” or “color of law” meant abuse of legal
authority.28 Section 1983 targeted both formal legal enactments and the
persistent and widespread customary practices that threatened
constitutional freedoms. It aimed to remedy violation of constitutionally
guaranteed rights, whether it resulted from official state action or statesanctioned private vigilantism.29 It sought to prevent and deter
constitutional violations and to promote systemic change by holding
governments and their agents accountable in a court of law to those they
victimized. And the legislators who enacted Section 1983 understood that
it would be interpreted broadly to promote its goal of redressing
government abuse of power: “This act is remedial, and in aid of the
preservation of human liberty and human rights. All statutes and
constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and
beneficently construed.”30
The text of Section 1983 does not provide for any governmental
immunities. This was a conscious choice. The members of the 42nd
Congress insisted that “whoever interferes” with constitutionally
guaranteed rights, “though it may be done under State law or State
regulation, shall not be exempt from responsibility to the party injured
when he brings suit for redress either at law or in equity.”31 Indeed,
Section 1983 was modeled on Section 2 of the Civil Rights of 1866,

27 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1871); id. at app. 313; see also id. at 459 (“[T]he
court of justice is the first instrument to be used in aid of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment . . . . [T]he
courts of justice of the nation stand with open doors, ready to receive and hear with impartial
attention the complaints of those who are denied redress elsewhere.”).
28 Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 326–27
(1992) (“[T]he central idea conveyed by the phrase had remained remarkably constant for six
centuries: Under color of law referred to official action without authority of law, in the nineteenth
as in the thirteenth century.”); David Achtenberg, A “Milder Measure of Villainy”: The Unknown
History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1,
59–60 (1999) (arguing that for members of the 42nd Congress “‘under color of” law meant ‘under
pretense of’ law”).
29 Because of the broad sweep of the term “under color of law,” and the statute’s historical goal
of combatting Klan violence, Section 1983 may prove to be particularly important to redress a new
form of legal vigilantism—the “trend in state legislatures to use private rights of action to penalize
and suppress highly personal and often constitutionally protected activities—not only abortions but
also LGBT rights and even the rights of teachers and students to discuss race in the classroom.”
Jon D. Michaels & David L. Noll, Vigilante Federalism 3 (Sept. 2, 2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3915944 [https://perma.cc/Y3ZX-A3H5].
30 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871).
31 Id. at app. 310.
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which created a federal criminal remedy that could not be overcome by a
claim of immunity. In debates preceding the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, legislators repeatedly rejected the notion that persons acting
under color of law should be entitled to immunity because of their status
as officers of the government. This, Senator Lyman Trumbull urged, was
“akin to the maxim of the English law that the King can do no wrong.”32
Senator Trumbull argued that such a claim of immunity improperly
“places officials above the law.”33 Section 1983 incorporated this
identical remedial framework. As its proponents urged, the 1866 Act
“provides a criminal proceeding in identically the same case as this one
provides a civil remedy.”34 Section 1983 was “carrying out the principles
of the civil rights bill” that state officers could not violate constitutional
rights with impunity.35 Section 1983, like the 1866 Act, did not provide
any immunities because Congress refused to “place[] officials above the
law.”36
That the Act provided a broad remedy for constitutional violations
by state and local officials unqualified by any immunities was understood
by both proponents and opponents of Section 1983. In “the language of
the bill,” Senator Allen Thurman stressed, “there is no limitation
whatsoever upon the terms that are employed, . . . they are as
comprehensive as can be used.”37 Seizing on Section 1983’s broad sweep,
congressional opponents complained that the provision allowed suit
against all manner of state actors and permitted them to be “dragged to
the bar of a distant and unfriendly court, and there placed in the pillory of
vexatious, expensive, and protracted litigation, and heavy damages and
amercements.”38 The new federal cause of action, they insisted, would
disturb the federal-state balance because “contests among citizens under
this provision will be numerous” and every state official whether “great
or small, will enter upon and pursue the call of official duty with the
sword of Damocles suspended over him by a silken thread.”39 Indeed, as

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866).
Id.; id. at 1267 (“[I]f a . . . sheriff . . . should take part in enforcing any State law making
distinctions among the citizens of the State on account of race or color, he shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor and punished with fine and imprisonment under this bill.”).
34 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871); id. at 461 (explaining that Section 1983
“gives a civil remedy parallel to the penal provision based upon the first section of the civil rights
act”).
35 Id. at 568.
36 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866).
37 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 217 (1871).
38 Id. at 365; id. at 337 (suggesting that “police officer[s]” might be sued “in distant and
expensive tribunals” if they acted to disarm “a drunken negro or white man upon the streets with
loaded pistol flourishing it . . . because the right to bear arms is secured by the Constitution”).
39 Id. at 429, 366.
32
33
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Senator Thurman bemoaned, state judges had already faced federal
criminal charges for violating the Civil Rights Act of 1866.40
Opponents of the 1871 legislation asked “where is the clause that
exempts” state legislators and other government officials from the new
federal cause of action Section 1983 created.41 These pleas were met with
a stony silence. The members of the 42nd Congress refused to write into
the law any exception to the cause of action Section 1983 afforded to
ensure respect for constitutional rights and state accountability.42
Pervasive state violence and the complete breakdown of justice in the
South demanded a bold new set of remedies to vindicate fundamental
rights and prevent the subjugation of Black citizens. Section 1983 sought
to hold state lawbreakers to account, not permit them to violate
fundamental rights with impunity.
II. HOW THE SUPREME COURT GUTTED SECTION 1983’S PROMISE OF
ACCOUNTABILITY
The Supreme Court has not respected the text and history of Section
1983, despite the statute’s clarity. Instead, it has effectively rewritten the
statute, inventing an array of immunities designed to make it easier for
government officials to avoid accountability. The Court has treated
Section 1983’s sparse but plain text as an open invitation to engage in
judicial policymaking, rewriting the statute in a host of ways, virtually all
designed to close the courthouse doors to those who have been victimized
by government abuse of power and negate any deterrent for ending
conditions and practices that result in systemic abuses. To be sure, courts
sometimes have to fill gaps in a statutory scheme, but doing so requires a
sensitivity to the statute’s design and Congress’s plan in passing it. That
sensitivity is wholly lacking in the Court’s judicially created immunity
doctrines. Rather than acting to fulfill the statute’s text, history, and
purpose, the Court has created a patchwork quilt of doctrines that do
violence to Section 1983’s aim of ensuring official accountability.
Section A looks at the Supreme Court’s qualified and absolute immunity
doctrines. Section B then turns to examine the judicially created limits on
suits against local governments. Section C examines the exclusion of
states from the scope of Section 1983.

Id. at app. 217.
Id.
42 Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court’s
Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741, 771 (1987) (“Congress was not silent about immunities;
it was only silent about retaining immunities.”).
40
41
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The Invention of Qualified and Absolute Immunity

The text of Section 1983 is as clear as can be: it makes state officials
acting under color of state law liable for constitutional violations and
provides no immunities from suit. Rather than heeding this text, the
Supreme Court has held that all state officials, in fact, must be accorded
a broad immunity from suit. Most have qualified immunity, a sweeping
form of immunity that permits holding an official liable only where
“existing precedent” was so clear that the “constitutional question” was
“beyond debate.”43 That means that much of the time, constitutional
violations go unremedied, justice is denied, and the contours of
constitutional rights may remain frozen in place, preventing rights from
ever becoming established in the first place.44 Other government actors,
including legislators, judges, prosecutors, and police witnesses have
absolute immunity,45 reflecting the Supreme Court’s view that any
judicial inquiry “would disserve the broader public interest.”46 In these
contexts, as Justice Thurgood Marshall put it, “the mere inquiry into good
faith is deemed so undesirable that we must simply acquiesce in the
possibility that government officials will maliciously deprive citizens of
their rights.”47 Through these doctrines, the Court has thwarted official
accountability across the board and sanctioned the abuse of power the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to prevent.
Even worse, these doctrines are completely gratuitous. The Court’s
immunity doctrines are driven by the fear that “personal monetary
liability . . . will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.”48
But this chilling effect does not in fact exist because of widespread
indemnification practices.49
In creating these sweeping governmental immunities, the Court has
insisted that Section 1983 does not mean what it says and that its rulings
simply recognize Congress’s failure to displace well-recognized tort
immunities existing in 1871. As the Court has repeatedly said, “[c]ertain
immunities were so well established in 1871, when [Section] 1983 was
enacted, that ‘we presume that Congress would have specifically so

Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 65–66 (2017).
45 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424–29 (1976) (prosecutors); Briscoe v. LaHue,
460 U.S. 325 (1983) (police witnesses).
46 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
47 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 368 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
49 Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 939 (2014).
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provided had it wished to abolish’ them.”50 This is wrong for three
different reasons.
First, the Court’s move to treat Section 1983 as a tort statute misses
what is at the statute’s core: ensuring constitutional accountability.51
Congress enacted Section 1983 not to provide a remedy for torts—a body
of law mostly designed to order private relations between individuals—
but for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of
fundamental rights and equality, many of which had no obvious tort
analogy. As Representative Aaron Perry stressed during the debates over
Section 1983, “[a]ll the injuries, denials, and privations,” which demand
a federal remedy, “are injuries, denials, and privations of rights and
immunities under the Constitution and laws of the United States. They
are not injuries inflicted by mere individuals or upon ordinary rights of
individuals.”52 Congress was not concerned with the niceties of state tort
law. A federal remedy—the likes of which had never existed
previously—was necessary to redress the systematic violation of
fundamental rights and utter breakdown of law and order. Congress was
not trying to federalize tort law, but to ensure accountability when state
officials participated in or condoned racial violence and trampled on
fundamental constitutional rights to keep Black people in a state of
second-class citizenship. In that context, it is highly unlikely that
Congress would have wanted to relegate those victimized by official
abuse of power to the remedies available under the common law tort
system.53 In the words of Justice John Marshall Harlan, “[i]t would indeed
be the purest coincidence if the state remedies for violations of commonlaw rights by private citizens were fully appropriate to redress those
injuries which only a state official can cause and against which the
Constitution provides protection.”54
Second, the historical record provides strong support for taking the
authors of Section 1983 at their word. Congress sought to provide a

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (quoting Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554–55).
Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1719, 1750 (1989) (arguing that “treating § 1983 as a tort statute marginalizes the important
constitution[al] interests it seeks to protect”).
52 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 79 (1871).
53 See David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the
Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 524 (1992) (arguing that “[i]mmunities
designed to minimize the extent to which common-law principles unintentionally impinged on
official prerogatives would be peculiarly ill-suited to a statute which was primarily intended to
prevent the abuse of those prerogatives”); Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal
Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 494 (1982) (observing that
“historical immunities . . . did not develop in contexts involving clear assertions of unconstitutional
action—they usually arose in cases involving state tort or contract law”).
54 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring), overruled in part on
other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
50
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framework to ensure constitutional accountability, not to allow
constitutional rights to be violated with impunity. Section 1983 provided
a mechanism that allowed government actors who actively participated
in the Klan’s reign of terror or simply looked the other way to be brought
to justice in the federal courts. Congress rejected the notion that
government officials should be free to violate constitutional rights simply
because of their official position. As the debates over Section 1983’s
precursor illustrate, official immunities prevent enforcement of
constitutional rights and undermine the rule of law because they “place[]
officials above the law.”55 The Supreme Court has simply ignored this
history, paying no respect to the judgment Congress made in enacting
Section 1983.
Third, the Court’s official immunity doctrines ignore that Congress
wrote Section 1983 against a legal backdrop that recognized the rule-oflaw values served by holding government officials accountable for abuse
of power. In 1871, government actors were generally strictly liable for
violating the legal rights of individuals, even when what was at issue was
a common law tort, not a constitutional violation. There were of course
some exceptions to this general rule. If a legislature passed a law that
violated legal rights, an individual could sue the officials who enforced
the law, not those who wrote it.56 If a judge flouted the Constitution, the
remedy was an appeal, not a suit against the judge.57 But in the mine run
of cases, the legal backdrop to Section 1983 promised official
accountability, not immunity.
Officials were frequently indemnified by the government for their
unlawful acts58—much as they are today—but they were not given a free
pass to trample on individual rights.59 What Chief Justice John Marshall
had written in Marbury v. Madison was still the law:
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under color
of his office, by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be
pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in the

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866).
John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 211
(2013).
57 Id. at 212. At the time of the passage of Section 1983, courts recognized judicial immunity
as well as a quasi-judicial immunity. See William Baude, Is Quasi-Judicial Immunity Qualified
Immunity?, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3746068
[https://perma.cc/9KNB-9JCV] (arguing that quasi-judicial immunity bears little resemblance to
the modern doctrine of qualified immunity).
58 James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and
Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1906–07 (2010).
59 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331
(1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851); Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439
(1836); Shanley v. Wells, 71 Ill. 78 (1873).
55
56
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ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the
judgment of the law.60

Marbury did not involve a suit for damages but courts applied the
principles it spelled out to hold government actors strictly liable for
violating constitutional limits.61 In other words, at the time of the
enactment of Section 1983, officials who violated constitutional limits—
whether well-intentioned or not—lacked immunity from suit.62
Thus, qualified immunity, quite simply, is a judicial invention that
cannot be squared with the text and history of Section 1983, prevents
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, turns principles of
constitutional accountability on their head, and finds no support in the
common law. Even worse, the doctrine is gratuitous because individual
officers are virtually always indemnified by the government. A proper
Section 1983 jurisprudence would require the Supreme Court to jettison
qualified immunity.
The Supreme Court’s absolute immunity doctrine makes this state
of affairs even worse, condoning even the most flagrant violation of
constitutional rights. On its face, absolute immunity seems nothing less
than a judicial repeal of Section 1983. How can a statute that gives
individuals the right to sue for violations of constitutional rights be
construed to mean that certain officials can never be sued for violating
the Constitution? There is much to be said for Justice William O.
Douglas’s view that “‘every person’ . . . mean[s] every person” and
therefore the text does not license the “creation” of “judicial
exception[s]” that permit government actors to maliciously flout the
Constitution.63 But in certain narrow settings, absolute immunities can be
appropriate.
There is at least some evidence that the Congress that enacted
Section 1983 did not understand the text to permit suits against legislators
for passing unconstitutional state laws. In the debates over the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, the precursor to Section 1983, Senator Lyman
Trumbull suggested that state legislators would not be liable for enacting
unconstitutional laws. Under the Act, Trumbull argued, “[t]he person
who, under the color of the law, does the act, not the men who made the

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It Changed,
and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 155 (2012) (arguing that government
officials received “immunity for acting within the appropriate bounds of discretion, strict liability
for acting outside of the authority enumerated by the Constitution”).
62 James E. Pfander, Zones of Discretion at Common Law, 116 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 148,
165–67 (2021).
63 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60
61
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law” may be held liable.64 Under this view, legislators cannot be sued for
passing an unconstitutional law, but those who are responsible for
enforcing those enactments can.
Judicial immunity is harder to reconcile with the text and history of
Section 1983 as originally enacted. As Justice Douglas observed in his
dissent in Pierson v. Ray, “every member of Congress who spoke to the
issue assumed that the words of the statute meant what they said and that
judges would be liable.”65 State judges, like other institutions of power,
were all too often either active or passive participants in the Klan’s reign
of terror.66 In its modern form, however, Section 1983’s text implicitly
recognizes judicial immunity. In 1996, Congress overrode the Supreme
Court’s decision in Pulliam v. Allen,67 which held that state judges could
be sued for injunctive relief for actions taken in their judicial capacity,
rejecting the argument that absolute judicial immunity prevented such a
suit. Congress provided “that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”68 Given that Congress has
recognized a form of judicial immunity in the context of equitable
actions—where usually there are no immunities of any kind—scaling
back judicial immunity in the context of damages actions is probably a
bridge too far.
Both legislative and judicial immunity cohere with the rule of law
because they leave alternative remedies available.69 But the judicially
created doctrine of absolute immunity, however, sweeps far more
broadly, making it impossible for those victimized by abuse of
government power to obtain any redress in a number of circumstances.
The most troubling aspect of the doctrine is absolute prosecutorial
immunity, which allows prosecutors to violate clearly established

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866).
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
66 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 976
(1987) (arguing “that many of the framers of section 1983 considered state judges to be active and
energetic participants in a pervasive effort to deprive a substantial segment of the southern populace
of fundamental human liberties”).
67 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
68 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-317, § 309, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853.
69 Jeffries, supra note 56, at 213–14 (arguing that “absolute legislative and judicial immunity
are deviations from the norm; they should be construed grudgingly, in close adherence to the
rationales that are thought to justify total abrogation of the constitutional tort remedy”). As Jeffries
argues, for legislators, “this means that absolute immunity should be confined to decisions of
general applicability that must be enforced by executive officers, who can themselves be sued for
violating constitutional rights.” Id. at 214. For judges, Jeffries argues that judicial immunity should
only apply when there is in fact a “corrective process” to ensure “a functioning system for the
enforcement of constitutional rights.” Id. at 214, 217.
64
65
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constitutional rights with impunity when acting as advocates.70 Civil
suits, where available, are an essential means of deterring prosecutorial
misconduct. Judicial review of criminal convictions rarely provides any
deterrence because courts are often loath to overturn criminal convictions
simply because a prosecutor committed misconduct.71 Because of
absolute immunity, individuals have no remedy when prosecutors abuse
the awesome power they possess. It does not matter how flagrant the
constitutional violation. Absolute immunity forecloses all accountability.
The fiction that Section 1983 did not disturb common-law
immunities does not provide justification for absolute prosecutorial
immunity. Prosecutorial immunity was unknown in the law in 1871.
Indeed, nineteenth century courts refused to exempt prosecuting
attorneys from liability for malicious prosecution because that would
“authoriz[e] those who are the most capable of mischief to commit the
grossest wrong.”72 As Margaret Johns has shown, “the common law on
the eve of passage of [Section] 1983” recognized “the well-established
tort of malicious prosecution” and provided “no immunity defense to
insulate the prosecutor from liability if the elements of the cause of action
were proven.”73 As Johns recounts, “there was not a single decision
affording prosecutors any kind of immunity defense from liability for
malicious prosecution.”74 The first American case to recognize
prosecutorial immunity was in 1896, a quarter of a century after the
passage of Section 1983.75 And prosecutorial misconduct was one of the
abuses of power that led to the Fourteenth Amendment.76 Absolute
70 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutor absolutely immune from suit for
initiating and maintaining a criminal prosecution); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (prosecutor
absolutely immune for participation in a probable-cause hearing); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118
(1997) (prosecutor absolutely immune for improperly preparing and filing charging documents);
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009) (lead prosecutor absolutely immune for failure to
train and supervise subordinates in disclosure of exculpatory impeachment evidence).
71 Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute Prosecutorial
Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 517 (2011) (citing studies to show that judicial review is
“entirely inadequate” because “even when prosecutorial misconduct is found . . . the offense is
found to be harmless in most of those cases, so the conviction stands”).
72 Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535, 538 (1852).
73 Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53,
114 (2005).
74 Id.
75 Burns, 500 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Johns, supra
note 71, at 526 (“[T]he doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity was unheard of for another
twenty-five years, until a state court in Indiana adopted it in Griffith v. Slinkard. Even after Griffith,
the common law regarding absolute prosecutorial immunity was not settled for decades.”).
76 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. NO. 39-30, at xviii
(1866) (“In some localities prosecutions have been instituted in State courts against Union officers
for acts done in the line of official duty, and similar prosecutions are threatened elsewhere as soon
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prosecutorial immunity prevents enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment and has no foundation in the common law at the time of the
passage of Section 1983.77
Despite all this, the Supreme Court in 1976 held that prosecutors
cannot be sued for violating an individual’s constitutional rights when
performing actions “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process.”78 What justifies giving prosecutors absolute immunity
in this setting? According to the Supreme Court, “[i]f a prosecutor had
only a qualified immunity, the threat of s[ection] 1983 suits would
undermine performance of his duties.”79 This is the same line of argument
that, according to the Court, justifies giving police officers and other
officials qualified immunity. So why should prosecutors have free rein to
violate even settled constitutional rights with impunity? The Court has
struggled to produce a coherent answer. It has recognized that where
prosecutors are merely investigating crime, there is no good reason for
giving them anything more than qualified immunity.80 But where the
prosecutor is acting as an advocate, the Court has said, anything less than
absolute immunity “would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance
of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the
criminal justice system.”81
This allows prosecutors to “strike” not only “hard blows,” but “foul
ones” as well.82 By giving prosecutors absolute immunity, the Supreme
Court has given prosecutors a free pass to violate constitutional rights,
undermined the integrity of our criminal justice system, and ruined the
lives of those wrongly accused of crime. Our justice system cannot, in
fact, dispense justice if prosecutors cannot be held accountable when they
flagrantly violate constitutional rights, such as by presenting false
testimony, coercing witnesses, or hiding exculpatory evidence.

as the United States troops are removed.”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1526 (1866)
(insisting on protection of former Union soldiers “from malicious persecution instituted and carried
on in the several States by those . . . who have taken every opportunity to assail, annoy, and trouble
the soldiers of the Federal Army”).
77 Burns, 500 U.S. at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that
Imbler relied “upon a common-law tradition of prosecutorial immunity that developed much later
than 1871, and was not even a logical extrapolation from then-established immunities”).
78 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
79 Id. at 424–25.
80 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 276 (1993); Burns, 500 U.S. at 495.
81 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–28.
82 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

108

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

B.

[2022

Local Government Liability Under Section 1983

When the government authorizes, supervises, equips, trains, and
pays an officer who violated constitutional rights in carrying out his or
her job, the governmental entity should be held liable in a court of law.
To quote now-Judge Nina Pillard, “constitutional violations require state
action, and thus the government that made an abuse of its official power
possible should . . . be held accountable for that abuse.”83 Because so
many constitutional violations are due to organizational conditions that
permit official violence and the violation of fundamental rights to
flourish, holding the governmental entity liable is a particularly valuable
means of vindicating constitutional rights.84 It signals that the
government—not merely a rogue officer—is responsible for
constitutional violations. And it creates an incentive for the government
to properly train and supervise its employees and eliminate conditions
that lead to a culture of disregard for constitutional rights and other
systemic drivers of harm. For these reasons, holding the government
accountable “is likely a better agent for spurring systemic changes that
may lead to an overall reduction in violations.”85
Under longstanding Supreme Court doctrine, however, this means
of ensuring constitutional accountability is almost always off the table.
The Supreme Court has rewritten Section 1983 to give local governments
a form of sovereign immunity.86 Just as the judicially created qualified
and absolute immunity doctrines make it incredibly difficult to sue an
individual officer, the so-called “policy and custom” requirement
invented by the Supreme Court erects an incredibly high hurdle to suing
a local governmental entity for constitutional violations committed by its
officials. Like qualified and absolute immunity, this doctrinal limit on
suits against local government has no basis in the text and history of

83 Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’
Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 75 (1999).
84 Id. (“[O]nly if government as an institution is held legally responsible for constitutional
violations will it feel pressure to institute prophylactic measures, whether by enhancing staffing,
improving training, or restructuring procedures.”); Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers:
Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damages Remedy for Law Enforcers’ Misconduct, 87
YALE L.J. 447, 457 (1978) (“Providing for suit directly against the employing department or unit
of government . . . would enhance the prospects for deterrence by placing responsibility for the
denial of constitutional rights on the entity with the capacity to take vigorous action to avoid
recurrence.”).
85 Smith, supra note 11, at 484; Fred O. Smith, Jr., Beyond Qualified Immunity, 119 MICH. L.
REV. ONLINE 121, 129 (2021) (arguing that “[a]ddressing the[] causes” of racial police violence
“requires more than accountability for individual police officers”).
86 Smith, supra note 11, at 416 (arguing that judicially created limits on suits against localities
“share[] core ideological and methodological features with state sovereignty doctrines”).
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Section 1983. The Court simply invented this demanding test out of
whole cloth.
Like qualified immunity, the limits on local governmental liability
doctrine is gratuitous because widespread indemnification, in practice,
means that the government pays when its agents violate constitutional
rights.87 Holding governments liable for constitutional violations
committed by their officers aligns with the reality that, on the ground,
governments assume responsibility for constitutional wrongs committed
by their agents.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court held
that a local government may only be held liable under Section 1983
“when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by
its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury” on the individual.88 Monell
did not require the Court to decide whether a local government could be
sued for constitutional violations committed by its officials because the
case challenged the constitutionality of an explicit city policy. The idea
that an official policy was required for municipal liability had not been
raised in the lower courts, much less briefed before the Supreme Court.89
But the Court adopted it anyway, firmly rejecting the idea that local
governments could be sued more broadly for constitutional violations
committed by their officers. Since Monell, the judicially created “policy
or custom” requirement has been repeatedly applied stringently to
immunize local governments from liability.
The word “policy” does not appear anywhere in Section 1983, but
the Court has seized on the supposed “policy requirement” to throw out
of court suits seeking to hold local governments liable for police killings
and other state violence,90 suits to redress a prosecutor’s office’s
deliberate indifference to its constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence,91 and suits alleging retaliation against government employees
for engaging in freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.92
It has been decades since the Supreme Court has found that a municipal

87 Schwartz, supra note 49, at 944 (“[M]unicipalities virtually always satisfy officers’
settlements and judgments, amounting to de facto respondeat superior liability. Complex and taxing
municipal liability standards are, therefore, virtually irrelevant in determining who writes the
check.”).
88 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
89 City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 842 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The
commentary on respondeat superior in Monell was not responsive to any argument advanced by
either party and was not even relevant to the Court’s actual holding.”).
90 Id. at 820–24 (plurality opinion); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397 (1997).
91 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011).
92 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
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policy caused a constitutional violation.93 During that time, the Court has
spilled much ink laboring to explain the so-called “policy requirement,”
spinning finer and finer distinctions to keep constitutional accountability
out of reach.
If a city enacts an ordinance or a mayor takes action that violates
constitutional rights, it is easy enough to say that the policy requirement
has been satisfied. But outside these circumstances, the Supreme Court
has adopted a very crabbed view of municipal responsibility for
constitutional violations. The Court’s cases take a formalistic approach
that focuses on “the actions of those whom the law establishe[s] as the
makers of municipal policy,”94 ignoring that much municipal policy is
not made in this fashion.95 And when the policy in question is a failure to
train subordinates about the need to respect constitutional guarantees, the
Court has adopted complex rules that effectively doom such claims to
failure, insisting that without “stringent culpability and causation
requirements,” claims based on training deficits “raise[] serious
federalism concerns.”96 So what began as an inquiry into policy has
morphed into one about culpability. Meanwhile the Supreme Court has
never held a local government liable based on a municipal custom, even
though, as Myriam Gilles has argued, “unwritten codes of conduct among
rank-and-file officers” are “the most pervasive force causing the
deprivation of constitutional rights on the local level.”97
Monell restricts local government liability in a manner
fundamentally inconsistent with Section 1983. The main abuses Section
1983 sought to remedy were not unconstitutional regulations adopted by
policymakers, but the fact that state and local officials winked at or
participated in Klan violence and refused to enforce laws that protected
Black Americans from harm.98 Rather than heeding the statute’s text and
history, the Court’s doctrine prioritizes local autonomy over the statute’s
goal of ensuring constitutional accountability by remedying and deterring
constitutional wrongs.

See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
Praprotnik, 485 U.S at 128.
95 Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from Tort Law and
Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1778–79 (1989).
96 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997); Connick, 563
U.S. at 61; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).
97 Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983
Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 50 (2000).
98 Robert J. Kaczorowski, Reflections on Monell’s Analysis of the Legislative History of
§ 1983, 31 URB. LAW. 407, 430 (1999) (“It was not racially discriminatory laws and policies that
presented the greatest concern to Congress in 1871. Rather, it was the inaction of law enforcement
officers, the complicity of public officials in criminal wrongdoing, and the failure of the states’
civil and criminal justice systems to protect against and to redress rights violations that Congress
was attempting to address.”).
93
94
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To justify the “policy or custom” requirement, the Court in Monell
made two points. Looking to the language of the statute, it first suggested
that Section 1983’s causation “language cannot be easily read to impose
liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.”99 But
in 1871, it was well-established that municipalities were persons in the
law,100 and municipalities were regularly held liable for the wrongful acts
of their employees in the course of their employment.101 And where the
government makes it possible for its employees to act in ways that violate
fundamental constitutional rights, pays them, directs them, equips them,
and gives them immense power to inflict harm, it is fair to say that the
government has “caused” the individual “to be subjected” to the
constitutional violation.102 The fact that Section 1983 requires a causal
nexus between the government action in question and the violation of
constitutional rights hardly justifies holding localities unaccountable for
constitutional violations committed by subordinate officers.
Monell spent little time focusing on the textual point. Instead, it
relied principally upon Congress’s rejection of the Sherman Amendment,
a different part of the 1871 legislation that included Section 1983. It is
dangerous for a court to interpret one section of a statute based on
Congress’s failure to enact a different provision, particularly when the
provisions deal with distinct problems. But Monell insisted that the
“policy or custom” requirement was necessary in light of the rejection of
the Sherman Amendment.
The Sherman Amendment—named for its sponsor Ohio Senator
John Sherman—sought to make municipalities shoulder the costs of
injuries inflicted by Klan violence, requiring localities to “take the
necessary steps to put down lawless violence” or face legal liability.103
There were three versions of the Sherman Amendment. The first sought
to make the inhabitants of a municipality strictly liable for injuries caused
by Klan violence, whether or not they had taken any action to prevent the

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).
Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (defining the term “person” to include
“bodies politic and corporate”).
101 See City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 836–37 & nn.8–9 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (collecting cases).
102 Schuck, supra note 95, at 1785 (“Municipalities are morally, causally, and functionally
responsible for most officially inflicted injuries in precisely the same sense that private enterprises
are; ‘official policy’ is but one source of that responsibility.”); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y.
Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983’s Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 787 (1992) (“If local
government officials and low-level employees could be reached precisely because they carried the
badge of government authority, is it reasonable to suppose that the 1871 Congress intended to
absolve the very governments who handed out the badges?”).
103 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 761 (1871).
99

100
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injuries.104 The second version—adopted by a Conference Committee
after the House rejected the original Sherman Amendment—imposed
strict liability on the municipalities rather than on local property
owners.105 Both versions of the Sherman Amendment were sweeping in
their breadth: they imposed liability for injuries caused by “riotous[] and
tumultuous[]” mob violence whether or not the inhabitants or the
municipality was at fault.106 Liability attached simply because legal
offenses had occurred in the municipality.
The Sherman Amendment, as modified, passed the Senate, but was
rejected by the House of Representatives. Opponents stressed two
arguments. First, they argued that the Sherman Amendment would have
created an unprecedented form of liability. The Amendment, they
claimed, would have “create[d] a corporate liability for personal injury
which no prudence or foresight could have prevented.”107 Even if the
local government “performed its duty to the utmost,” it could still be held
liable.108 A key part of the problem was that the Sherman Amendment
would have made municipalities strictly liable for conduct by third parties
they could not control. As Kentucky Senator John Stevenson asked, “[i]s
it possible for any city . . . to foresee what the midnight incendiary may
do, or what bad men may do upon the eve of the election, secretly and
clandestinely in combination?”109
Second, opponents of the Sherman Amendment argued, based on
then-binding Supreme Court precedent, that Congress lacked power
under the Constitution to impose on localities a new legal obligation to
keep the peace.110 As Representative John Farnsworth declared, the
Supreme Court has held that “Congress can impose no duty on a State
officer. . . . Nor can Congress confer any power or impose any duty upon
the county or city. Can we then impose on a county or other State
municipality liability where we cannot require a duty? I think not.”111

Id. at 663.
Id. at 749.
106 Id. at 663, 749.
107 Id. at 762.
108 Id. at 771.
109 Id. at 762.
110 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 66 (1861); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871). Ultimately, the Supreme Court
held that these cases did not apply to legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment because “the
Constitution now expressly gives authority for congressional interference and compulsion in the
cases embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347–48
(1880). Given the explicit enforcement power in Section 5, the Virginia Court could “not perceive
how holding an office under a State, and claiming to act for the State, can relieve the holder from
obligation to obey the Constitution of the United States, or take away the power of Congress to
punish his disobedience.” Id. at 348.
111 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 799 (1871).
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Ultimately, Congress adopted a much narrower provision, which
imposed liability on any person who could have prevented Klan violence
but failed to do so.112
Monell held that the rejection of the Sherman Amendment
foreclosed holding local governments liable for constitutional violations
committed by their officials under color of law. According to Monell,
“creation of a federal law of respondeat superior would have raised all
the constitutional problems associated with the obligation to keep the
peace, an obligation Congress chose not to impose because it thought
imposition of such an obligation unconstitutional.”113 This is wrong.
First, Section 1983 did not impose a new legal duty akin to the one
that opponents of the Sherman Amendment objected. Rather, Section
1983 provided a legal remedy for enforcing constitutional rights—rights
that state and local governments were already under a constitutional duty
to respect. Section 1983, hence, did not create any new rights or duties; it
simply provided a cause of action to ensure that those victimized by abuse
of power could go to federal court to hold government actors accountable
for violating the Constitution.114 Monell erred in suggesting that holding
municipalities liable for constitutional violations committed by their
officers raised any constitutional issue.
Second, the Sherman Amendment did not involve a form of
respondeat superior liability, and nothing in the debate over the Sherman
Amendment impugned municipal liability for legal wrongs committed by
a city’s employees. In 1871, respondeat superior municipal liability—the
idea that governments could be held liable for legal wrongs committed
by their agents within the scope of their employment—was well
established in the law. As David Achtenberg has shown, this rule of
governmental liability reflected four ideas which defined the rule and its
limits: (1) the legal unity of employer and employee; (2) the employer’s
legal power to direct and control his employee; (3) the fact that the
employer holds out his employees as “careful, competent, and wellintentioned”; and 4) the need to ensure that the benefits and liabilities of
the employer-employee relationship were reciprocal.115 The Sherman
112 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (establishing a cause of action against “[e]very person who, having
knowledge” of conspiracies to violate federal rights and “power to prevent or aid in preventing the
commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do”).
113 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693 (1978).
114 Larry Kramer & Alan O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 1987 S. CT. REV. 249, 261 (1987) (arguing “that the constitutional objections to the
Sherman [A]mendment have no bearing on whether a municipality may be liable under § 1983 on
a respondeat superior theory” because “there was no constitutional impediment to holding [state]
officers liable if they violated the Constitution while performing tasks delegated to them by the
state”).
115 David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Debate Over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2196–2203 (2005).
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Amendment proved so controversial because it departed so significantly
from these precepts. It sought to hold localities liable for the conduct of
third parties whom they could neither direct nor control, whether or not
the local government had notice of impending violence or any means at
their disposal to prevent it.116 In short, the defeat of the Sherman
Amendment was based on concerns about the form of liability it would
have created, not about municipal liability writ large.
Monell has produced a tortured jurisprudence that undermines
Section 1983’s goal of constitutional accountability, prevents systemic
reform, and mires courts in confusing inquiries. A rule with such
deleterious consequences that, in the words of Justice Breyer, “requires
so many such distinctions to maintain its legal life may not deserve such
longevity.”117
C.

The Exclusion of States from the Scope of Section 1983

The limits on suing state governments for violating constitutional
rights are even more stringent. The Supreme Court has held that states
are not persons under Section 1983 and cannot be sued under any
circumstances. This creates a nonsensical distinction in the law—
municipalities can sometimes be sued, while states cannot—and stymies
efforts to hold states accountable for flouting constitutional rights.
In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,118 the Supreme
Court held “that a State is not a person within the meaning of [Section]
1983,” reasoning that the statute’s text reflected no design to alter the
constitutional balance of power between states and the federal
government.119 It did not matter that the central purpose of Section 1983
was to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to provide a cause of
action that allowed persons victimized by abuse of state power to seek
redress. That fact, the majority said, “does not suggest that the State itself
was a person that Congress intended to be subject to liability.” 120 Thus,
state entities can never be sued under Section 1983.
Will’s construction of Section 1983 was powerfully shaped by the
majority’s view of the Eleventh Amendment as a guarantee of state

116 Id. at 2196 (arguing the four rationales for respondeat superior “were powerful arguments in
favor of holding employers (including municipal employers) liable for the torts of their employees
and were equally powerful arguments against adopting the type of liability contemplated by the
Sherman Amendment”).
117 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 435 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
118 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
119 Id. at 64–65.
120 Id. at 68.
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sovereign immunity.121 Justice William Brennan’s dissent in Will aptly
likened the Eleventh Amendment to a “guest who would not leave” and
suggested that “the Eleventh Amendment lurks everywhere in today's
decision and, in truth, determines its outcome.”122 Will turned a blind eye
to the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered our
Constitution’s federal structure and gave Congress broad enforcement
powers to ensure states respected bedrock rights of liberty and equality,
reshaping the very meaning of state sovereignty and federalism in the
process.123 As the Supreme Court observed just a few years after the
enactment of Section 1983, “[t]he prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment are directed to the States . . . . It is these which Congress is
empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action, however put
forth, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial. Such
enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty.”124 Will ignored how the
Fourteenth Amendment redrew the federal-state balance to give Congress
the power to hold states accountable for violating constitutional
protections—authority Congress used to enact Section 1983.
The Congress that wrote Section 1983 did not legislate against a
background principle of sovereign immunity.125 As Katherine Mims
Crocker has recently noted, “[a]s things stood when Congress
transformed the relationship between the federal and state governments
during Reconstruction, the Court had never said that citizens could not
sue their own states on the basis of federal question jurisdiction in federal
court.”126 In 1871, “there was no widespread and definitive belief that
state sovereign immunity barred cases beyond the Amendment’s textual
ambit.”127 Eventually, in Hans v. Louisiana,128 the Supreme Court of the
Plessy v. Ferguson era would refashion the Eleventh Amendment into a
general principle of state sovereign immunity and prevent federal courts
from hearing suits by individuals against their home state to vindicate
constitutional rights—a holding that has been sharply criticized as
“rooted in a pre-Fourteenth Amendment view of the federal courts’

Id. at 67 (declining “to adopt a reading of § 1983 that disregards” the Eleventh Amendment).
Id. at 71–72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123 Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1809 (2010)
(“Increasing congressional power at the expense of the states was the whole point of the new
constitutional structure that followed the Civil War.”).
124 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880).
125 See Nichol, supra note 66, at 1009 (“[T]he framers of the statute were far more concerned
with achieving constitutional compliance than with respecting traditional notions of state
sovereignty.”).
126 Katherine Mims Crocker, Reconsidering Section 1983’s Nonabrogation of Sovereign
Immunity, 73 FLA. L. REV. 523, 526 (2021).
127 Id. at 549.
128 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
121
122

116

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2022

role.”129 But, at the time of the enactment of Section 1983, the Eleventh
Amendment did not stand for any sweeping principle of state sovereign
immunity.130 Thus, as a historical matter, there is no principled basis for
severely limiting the reach of Section 1983—a statute passed not to
confer immunity on states but to ensure they respected the Fourteenth
Amendment’s limits—out of respect for the sovereign immunity of states.
Excluding states from the scope of Section 1983 undermines Section
1983’s raison d’etre: to ensure states would be accountable for violating
constitutionally guaranteed rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Will’s reading of the statute also ignores that, at the time Section
1983 was framed, states were considered “bodies politic and corporate”
and therefore were persons for purposes of federal law.131 Legal
dictionaries at the time explained that the term “body politic,” “[w]hen
applied to the government . . . signifies the state.”132 Supreme Court
opinions of the era, too, recognized that “[e]very sovereign State is of
necessity a body politic, or artific[i]al person.”133 Indeed, the members of
Congress that enacted Section 1983 into law employed this very same
usage.134 The text of Section 1983 does not require excluding states from
the reach of Section 1983.
The Will Court’s sterile textual analysis not only ignored powerful
evidence that states were persons under the law, but also turned a blind
eye to the transformation Section 1983 wrought. Section 1983 sought to
accomplish what no statute had previously contemplated: it opened the
courthouse doors to individuals injured by unconstitutional abuses
committed by states and state actors for the first time in history. As even
its opponents conceded, the statute gave federal courts the power to
redress constitutional violations committed by state and local

129 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on
Law, Race, History, and “Federal Courts,” 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 2044 (2003).
130 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) (observing that “[w]e must
ascribe the amendment . . . to some other cause than the dignity of a State”); Osborn v. Bank of
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857–58 (1824) (“The amendment has its full effect, if the
[C]onstitution be construed as it would have been construed, had the jurisdiction of the Court never
been extended to suits brought against a State, by the citizens of another State, or by aliens.”);
Crocker, supra note 126, at 548 (“[A]s of 1871, the only high-court decision analyzing a suit against
a citizen’s own state in light of the Eleventh Amendment had expressly held the provision’s
protections inapplicable.”).
131 Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431; Crocker, supra note 126, at 563 (“[S]tates
were often called ‘bodies politic,’ with or without reference to ‘bodies corporate’ or the like,
between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.”).
132 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 185 (11th
ed. 1862) (emphasis in original).
133 Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1851); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114
U.S. 270, 288 (1885).
134 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 661 (1871); id. at 696.
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governments—“a jurisdiction that may be constitutionally conferred
upon it . . . but that has never yet been conferred upon it” before that
time.135 To enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress revolutionized
the jurisdiction of the federal courts to make certain that the federal
judiciary could perform the task of ensuring constitutional accountability
by states and state actors. And the term “person” was easily broad enough
to include state governments. Will simply ignored the vast ways in which
the Reconstruction Congress altered the balance between the federal and
state governments to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s promises of
freedom and equality.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s Section 1983 jurisprudence turns principles of
statutory and constitutional interpretation on their head. Rather than
respecting the text enacted into law by Congress to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rewritten it. It has
superseded Section 1983’s plain guarantee that individuals can sue
governments and their agents for violating federal constitutional rights
with a host of complex and often hard to understand doctrines that all too
often provide immunity, not accountability. The result is a litany of
doctrines that allow government officials to kill, act brutally, violate
fundamental rights, and subordinate the most marginalized in our society,
all too often with impunity.
But lawmakers in Congress can change this. Nearly two years after
the killing of George Floyd ignited a renewed national focus on police
brutality and the failures of justice, our nation’s elected representatives
have the opportunity and the responsibility to begin repairing our system
of constitutional accountability and ensure that our most cherished
constitutional guarantees do not merely exist on paper. The only way to
fix the long line of immunity doctrines devised by the Court is to end
them, and to ensure that those wronged by the government can seek
justice in the courts.
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